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California Trial Objections 2018

Prepare for trial and depositions with this essential resource.

Prepare for trial and depositions with this essential resource.

  • Carry the laminated Checklist of Objections in your trial notebook
  • Confidently move to exclude inadmissible hearsay and opinion
  • Get in-depth treatment of all California privileges
  • Stay current on case law interpreting “testimonial statements” under Crawford and Davis
  • Confidently prepare your evidence and your experts for trial
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Prepare for trial and depositions with this essential resource.

  • Carry the laminated Checklist of Objections in your trial notebook
  • Confidently move to exclude inadmissible hearsay and opinion
  • Get in-depth treatment of all California privileges
  • Stay current on case law interpreting “testimonial statements” under Crawford and Davis
  • Confidently prepare your evidence and your experts for trial
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1

Right to Present Relevant Evidence

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Using This Book to Object and Respond to Objections  1.1
    • B.  Organization and Scope of Book  1.2
  • II.  “EVIDENCE,” “PRESUMPTION,” AND “INFERENCE” DEFINED  1.3
  • III.  WHAT CONSTITUTES RELEVANT EVIDENCE?
    • A.  Civil Cases  1.4
    • B.  Criminal Cases  1.5
      • 1.  Proposition 8  1.6
      • 2.  Proposition 115  1.7
  • IV.  APPLICATION OF EVIDENCE CODE
    • A.  Civil Cases  1.8
    • B.  Criminal Cases  1.9
      • 1.  Provisions That Differ in Criminal Trials  1.10
      • 2.  Provisions That Do Not Apply in Criminal Trials  1.11
  • V.  APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTION AND CASE LAW TO CRIMINAL CASES  1.12
  • VI.  CHECKLIST: OBJECTING TO EVIDENCE  1.13

2

Motions in Limine

  • I.  HISTORY  2.1
  • II.  DEFINITION  2.2
  • III.  USES OF MOTION IN LIMINE
    • A.  To Exclude Evidence  2.3
    • B.  To Seek Limiting Instructions  2.4
    • C.  To Prevent Undue Prejudice  2.5
    • D.  To Prohibit Use of Evidence as Sanction for Abuse of Discovery  2.6
    • E.  To Seek Admission of Evidence  2.7
  • IV.  BENEFITS AND RISKS OF MAKING MOTION
    • A.  Benefits  2.8
    • B.  Risks  2.9
    • C.  Judge’s View  2.10
  • V.  PROCEDURES
    • A.  Timing of Motion  2.10A
    • B.  Format and Notice Requirements
      • 1.  Written Motions in Limine  2.11
      • 2.  Oral Motions in Limine  2.12
  • VI.  IN LIMINE ORDERS
    • A.  Preliminary or Conditional Rulings  2.13
    • B.  Final Rulings  2.14
  • VII.  RENEWING MOTION DURING TRIAL TO PRESERVE GROUND FOR APPEAL
    • A.  Reiteration Rule  2.15
    • B.  Making a Record  2.16
  • VIII.  VIOLATIONS OF IN LIMINE ORDERS  2.17
  • IX.  PRESERVING RECORD ON APPEAL  2.18
  • X.  FORMS
    • A.  Form: Motion in Limine  2.19
    • B.  Form: Order in Limine  2.20

3

Order of Proof

  • I.  TRIAL COURT’S POWER TO REGULATE  3.1
  • II.  USUAL ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS  3.2
    • A.  Civil Trials  3.3
    • B.  Criminal Trials  3.4
  • III.  ORDER OF EXAMINING WITNESS
    • A.  Usual Order  3.5
    • B.  Conditional Admission of Testimony  3.6
  • IV.  ORDER OF DETERMINING ISSUES
    • A.  Civil Trials  3.7
    • B.  Criminal Trials  3.8
  • V.  RULING ON ORDER OF PROOF IS NOT RULING ON ADMISSIBILITY  3.9

4

Objecting to Evidence

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Importance of Weighing Alternatives  4.1
    • B.  Reasons for Objecting  4.2
    • C.  Reasons for Not Objecting
      • 1.  Danger of Alienating Jury  4.3
      • 2.  Danger of Highlighting Harmful Evidence  4.4
      • 3.  Negligible Harm Threatened  4.5
      • 4.  Reversal on Appeal Unlikely  4.6
      • 5.  When Trial Judge’s Questions Are Objectionable  4.7
    • D.  Waiver; Invited Error  4.8
  • II.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING
    • A.  Not Objecting  4.9
    • B.  Combining Series of Objections
      • 1.  Introduction  4.10
      • 2.  Continuing Objections  4.11
      • 3.  Adoptive Objections  4.12
      • 4.  Summary Objections  4.13
    • C.  Impeaching the Witness  4.14
  • III.  MAKING THE OBJECTION
    • A.  Statutory Requirements  4.15
    • B.  Timeliness  4.16
    • C.  Form
      • 1.  Wording  4.17
      • 2.  Specific Ground Essential  4.18
      • 3.  General Objection Insufficient  4.19
    • D.  Obtaining a Ruling  4.20

5

Responding to Objections

  • I.  CHECKLIST OF RESPONSES  5.1
  • II.  INVOKING EXCEPTIONS TO EXCLUSIONARY RULES  5.2
  • III.  CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE  5.3
  • IV.  OFFERS OF PROOF
    • A.  Nature and Function; Proving Substance, Purpose, and Relevancy  5.4
    • B.  When Offer of Proof Is Not Required
      • 1.  During Cross-Examination  5.5
      • 2.  After Broad Exclusionary Ruling  5.6
      • 3.  If Question Contains Necessary Elements  5.7
      • 4.  If Necessary Elements Otherwise Apparent  5.8
    • C.  Procedure for Offer of Proof
      • 1.  Out of Jury’s Presence  5.9
      • 2.  Substance of Offered Evidence  5.10
      • 3.  Purpose of Offered Evidence  5.11
      • 4.  Relevancy of Offered Evidence  5.12
      • 5.  Availability of Offered Evidence  5.13
    • D.  Objections to Offers of Proof  5.14
  • V.  RESPONSES
    • A.  Counsel’s Duty to Seek Other Methods of Proof  5.15
    • B.  Rephrasing the Question  5.16
    • C.  Presenting Other Proof  5.17

6

Objections to Jury Voir Dire

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  6.1
  • II.  PRE-VOIR DIRE PROCEDURES
    • A.  Challenges for Cause to Panel as a Whole
      • 1.  When Challenge Is Available  6.2
      • 2.  Procedure  6.3
      • 3.  Differences Between Civil and Criminal Cases  6.4
    • B.  Pre-Voir Dire Conference
      • 1.  Civil  6.5
      • 2.  Criminal  6.6
    • C.  Objections at Pre-Voir Dire Conference  6.7
      • 1.  Motions in Limine  6.8
      • 2.  Trial Brief  6.9
      • 3.  Juror Questionnaire  6.10
  • III.  METHODS OF SEATING JURORS FOR QUESTIONING AND CHALLENGING  6.11
    • A.  “Jury Box” Method  6.12
    • B.  “Six Pack” or “Struck Juror” Method  6.13
  • IV.  QUESTIONING BY TRIAL JUDGE AND COUNSEL  6.14
    • A.  Civil  6.15
    • B.  Criminal  6.16
  • V.  CHALLENGES
    • A.  Challenges for Cause
      • 1.  Grounds for Challenge  6.17
        • a.  General Disqualification  6.18
        • b.  Implied Bias  6.19
        • c.  Actual Bias  6.20
      • 2.  Both Court and Counsel May Exercise Challenge  6.21
      • 3.  How and When to Exercise Challenge  6.22
      • 4.  Trial of Challenge for Cause  6.23
    • B.  Peremptory Challenges
      • 1.  How and When to Exercise Challenges  6.24
      • 2.  Number of Challenges Permitted
        • a.  Civil  6.25
        • b.  Criminal  6.26
      • 3.  Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges: Wheeler-Elem Rule
        • a.  Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges Prohibited in Both Civil and Criminal Trials  6.27
        • b.  Proving Prima Facie Case  6.28
        • c.  Rebutting Prima Facie Case  6.29
        • d.  Proof Currently Accepted at Hearing  6.30
        • e.  Determination by Court  6.31
        • f.  Appellate Review  6.32
  • VI.  GROUNDS FOR OBJECTING TO IMPROPER VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS
    • A.  Question Attempts to Indoctrinate Jurors on Law
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.33
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.34
    • B.  Question Based on Incorrect Statement of Law
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.35
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.36
    • C.  Question Asks Jurors to Prejudge Evidence
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.37
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.38
    • D.  Question Introduces Prejudicial Matter
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.39
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.40
    • E.  Question Improper if Not Related to Challenge for Cause (Special Rule for Criminal Cases)
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.41
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.42
      • 3.  Response to Objection: Connect Question to Basis for Challenge  6.43
    • F.  Question Prohibited by Judicial Administrative Standards  6.44
    • G.  Question in Improper Form  6.45
  • VII.  HOW TO OBJECT TO IMPROPER VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
    • A.  Objection to Examination by Judge  6.46
    • B.  Objection to Examination by Counsel; “Speaking Objections”  6.47
    • C.  Motion for Mistrial  6.48
  • VIII.  WAIVER OF OBJECTION  6.49
  • IX.  ISSUES ON APPEAL  6.50
  • X.  SELECTED RULES OF COURT AND STATUTES
    • A.  Civil
      • 1.  California Rules of Court  6.51
      • 2.  Code of Civil Procedure  6.52
    • B.  Criminal
      • 1.  California Rules of Court  6.53
      • 2.  Code of Civil Procedure  6.54

7

Question Is Ambiguous or Unintelligible

  • I.  DEFINITION  7.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  7.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS  7.3
  • IV.  SPEAKING OBJECTIONS  7.4
  • V.  STATUTE  7.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  7.6

8

Question Is Compound

  • I.  DEFINITION  8.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  8.2
  • III.  ILLUSTRATIONS  8.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  8.4
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  8.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  8.6

9

Question Is Too General

  • I.  DEFINITION  9.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  9.2
  • III.  ILLUSTRATION  9.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  9.4
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  9.5

10

Question Calls for Narrative Answer

  • I.  DEFINITION  10.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  10.2
  • III.  ILLUSTRATIONS  10.3
  • IV.  TRIAL JUDGE’S ROLE  10.4
  • V.  STATUTE  10.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  10.6

11

Question Has Been Asked and Answered

  • I.  DEFINITION  11.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  11.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS  11.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  11.4
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  11.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  11.6

12

Question Misquotes Witness

  • I.  DEFINITION  12.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATIONS  12.2
  • III.  ADDITIONAL REMEDIES  12.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  12.4
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  12.5

13

Question Is Leading

  • I.  DEFINITION  13.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATIONS
    • A.  Leading Questions  13.2
    • B.  Questions Not Leading  13.3
  • III.  PROPER LEADING QUESTIONS DURING DIRECT OR REDIRECT EXAMINATION
    • A.  Introduction  13.4
    • B.  To Establish Preliminary Matters  13.5
    • C.  To Refresh Recollection  13.6
    • D.  To Aid Witnesses Requiring Assistance in Testifying  13.7
    • E.  To Question Expert Witnesses  13.8
    • F.  To Question Hostile Witnesses  13.9
    • G.  To Question Witnesses Who Have Changed Their Stories  13.10
    • H.  To Identify Exhibits  13.11
  • IV.  IMPROPER LEADING QUESTIONS DURING CROSS- OR RECROSS-EXAMINATION  13.12
  • V.  STATUTE  13.13
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  13.14
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  13.15

14

Question Is Argumentative

  • I.  DEFINITION  14.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATION  14.2
  • III.  STATUTE  14.3
  • IV.  STATING THE OBJECTION  14.4

15

Question Assumes Fact in Dispute or Not in Evidence

  • I.  DEFINITION  15.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  15.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS
    • A.  Direct Examination  15.3
    • B.  Cross-Examination  15.4
  • IV.  ILLUSTRATIONS  15.5
  • V.  CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE  15.6
  • VI.  ADDITIONAL REMEDIES  15.7
  • VII.  STATUTE  15.8
  • VIII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  15.9

16

Question Calls for Speculation

  • I.  DEFINITION  16.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATIONS  16.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS  16.3
    • A.  Lay Witnesses: Opinion Testimony Versus Speculation  16.4
    • B.  Expert Witnesses: Speculation  16.5
  • IV.  STATUTE  16.6
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  16.7

17

Irrelevant Evidence

  • I.  STATUTORY PROVISIONS  17.1
  • II.  RELEVANCY
    • A.  Under Evidence Code  17.2
    • B.  Admissibility of Evidence to Which Opposing Counsel Offers to Stipulate  17.3
    • C.  Relevancy in Criminal Actions  17.4
    • D.  Admissibility of Prior Convictions  17.5
    • E.  Admissibility of Evidence to Support “Third Party Defense”  17.6
  • III.  LAYING FOUNDATION FOR RELEVANCY  17.7
  • IV.  “INCOMPETENT, IRRELEVANT, AND IMMATERIAL”  17.8
  • V.  FAILURE TO OBJECT TO IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE  17.9
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  17.10
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  17.11

18

Incompetent Witness

  • I.  GENERAL DESCRIPTION
    • A.  Definition  18.1
    • B.  Statutory Grounds  18.2
    • C.  Statute  18.3
  • II.  ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY GROUNDS
    • A.  Inability to Communicate
      • 1.  Definition  18.4
      • 2.  Ruling on Objection  18.5
      • 3.  Statute  18.6
      • 4.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.7
      • 5.  Stating the Objection  18.8
    • B.  Inability to Understand Duty to Tell Truth
      • 1.  Definition  18.9
      • 2.  Ruling on Objection  18.10
      • 3.  Statute  18.11
      • 4.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.12
      • 5.  Stating the Objection  18.13
    • C.  Attorney as Witness
      • 1.  Definition  18.14
      • 2.  Statute; Rule of Professional Conduct  18.15
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.16
    • D.  Judge as Witness
      • 1.  Definition  18.17
      • 2.  Statute  18.18
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.19
    • E.  Juror as Witness  18.20
    • F.  Lack of Personal Knowledge
      • 1.  Definition  18.21
      • 2.  Illustrations  18.22
      • 3.  Ruling on Objection  18.23
      • 4.  Statute  18.24
      • 5.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.25
      • 6.  Stating the Objection  18.26
    • G.  Juror Impeaching Verdict
      • 1.  Discussion  18.27
      • 2.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.28
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.29
    • H.  Testimony Based on Use of Speedtrap
      • 1.  Discussion; Statute  18.30
      • 2.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.31
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.32

19

Hearsay

  • I.  DEFINITION  19.1
  • II.  HEARSAY RULE  19.2
  • III.  WHAT IS HEARSAY?
    • A.  Out-of-Court Statement  19.3
    • B.  Out-of-Court Statement Offered to Prove Truth of Matter Stated  19.4
  • IV.  WHAT IS NOT HEARSAY?
    • A.  Statement Offered as Circumstantial Evidence  19.5
    • B.  Statement Offered to Prove That Statement Was Made  19.6
    • C.  Statement Offered to Prove Knowledge or Belief  19.7
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE: ADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
    • A.  Major Categories  19.8
    • B.  Important Considerations Regarding Exceptions
      • 1.  Other Exclusionary Rules May Apply  19.9
      • 2.  Testimonial Statements May Be Barred by Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
        • a.  Crawford v Washington: “Testimonial” Hearsay  19.9A
        • b.  Determining Whether Crawford Applies  19.9B
      • 3.  Proponent Must Lay Foundation  19.10
      • 4.  Declarant Is Unavailable  19.11
      • 5.  Statement Is Untrustworthy  19.12
    • C.  Descriptive Catalog of Exceptions
      • 1.  Confessions and Admissions
        • a.  Admissions of Parties  19.13
        • b.  Adoptive Admissions  19.14
        • c.  Authorized Admissions  19.15
        • d.  Admissions of Co-Conspirators  19.16
      • 2.  Statements Under Evid C §§1231–1231.4  19.16A
      • 3.  Statements Under Evid C §§1224–1228  19.17
      • 4.  Declarations Against Interest  19.18
      • 5.  Prior Statements of Witnesses
        • a.  Statement Inconsistent With Present Testimony  19.19
        • b.  Prior Consistent Statements Offered Under Evid C §1236  19.20
        • c.  Past Recollection Recorded  19.21
        • d.  Prior Statement Identifying Persons  19.22
      • 6.  Spontaneous, Contemporaneous, and Dying Declarations  19.23
      • 7.  Statements of Mental or Physical State  19.24
      • 8.  Statements Relating to Wills, Revocable Trusts, or to Claims Against Estates  19.25
      • 9.  Business Records  19.26
      • 10.  Official Records and Other Official Writings  19.27
      • 11.  Former Testimony
        • a.  Former Testimony Defined (Evid C §1290)  19.28
        • b.  Parties Same in Former Action (Evid C §1291)  19.29
        • c.  Party Different in Former Action (Evid C §1292)  19.30
        • d.  Minor in Child Dependency Action (Evid C §1293)  19.31
        • e.  Inconsistent Statement (Evid C §1294)  19.31A
      • 12.  Judgments  19.32
      • 13.  Family History  19.33
      • 14.  Reputation or Statements Concerning Community History, Property Interests, or Character  19.34
      • 15.  Dispositive Instruments or Ancient Writings  19.35
      • 16.  Statements in Commercial, Scientific, or Similar Publications  19.36
      • 17.  Parent’s or Guardian’s Failure to Cooperate in Child Welfare Services Case Plan as Evidence in Proceeding to Terminate Parental Rights  19.36A
      • 18.  Bills Offered to Corroborate Other Evidence  19.37
      • 19.  Testimony Given at Preliminary Hearing in Criminal Case  19.38
      • 20.  Testimony Given at CCP §527.8 Hearing to Enjoin Workplace Violence and Threats  19.38A
  • VI.  IMPEACHING HEARSAY DECLARANT  19.39
  • VII.  COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT HEARSAY RULE
    • A.  “Self-Serving” Is Not an Objection  19.40
    • B.  “Res Gestae” Is Not an Exception  19.41
  • VIII.  CHECKLIST: HEARSAY PROBLEMS  19.42
  • IX.  STATUTE  19.43
  • X.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  19.44
  • XI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  19.45

20

Inadmissible Opinion

  • I.  DEFINITION  20.1
  • II.  ADMISSIBLE OPINION BY LAY WITNESS
    • A.  Introduction  20.2
    • B.  Lay Opinion Permitted on Certain Subject Matter  20.3
    • C.  Lay Opinion Otherwise Permitted  20.4
    • D.  Statute  20.5
  • III.  ADMISSIBLE OPINION BY EXPERT WITNESS
    • A.  Qualification as Expert  20.6
    • B.  Special Type of Subject Matter Beyond Common Experience  20.7
    • C.  Basis of Expert Opinion  20.8
      • 1.  Expert May Rely on Inadmissible Matter  20.9
      • 2.  Scientific Evidence  20.10
        • a.  Kelly-Frye Standard  20.11
        • b.  California’s Kelly Test
          • (1)  Establishing General Acceptance of New Scientific Technique or Theory  20.12
          • (2)  Applying Kelly Test to Scientific Evidence
            • (a)  Techniques That Passed Test  20.13
            • (b)  Techniques That Did Not Pass Test  20.14
        • c.  Federal Courts’ Daubert Test
          • (1)  Daubert I  20.15
          • (2)  Daubert II  20.16
        • d.  Impact of Daubert in California: People v Leahy  20.17
        • e.  Psychological Opinion  20.18
    • D.  Hypothetical Questions
      • 1.  Use  20.19
      • 2.  General Rules of Framing  20.20
    • E.  Appointment of Experts  20.21
    • F.  Statutes  20.22
  • IV.  PROCEDURES FOR TESTING OPINION TESTIMONY
    • A.  Foundational Examination Before Opinion Stated  20.23
    • B.  Voir Dire Examination of Expert  20.24
    • C.  Cross-Examination After Opinion Stated  20.25
    • D.  Impeachment of Expert by Extrinsic Evidence  20.26
    • E.  Cross-Examination of Third Person if Expert’s Opinion Is Based on Hearsay  20.27
  • V.  OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE IS PERMISSIBLE  20.28
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  20.29
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION
    • A.  Lay Witness  20.30
    • B.  Expert Witness  20.31
  • VIII.  RESPONSE: MOTION TO STRIKE  20.32

21

Insufficient Foundation

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  21.1
  • II.  DETERMINING TYPE OF FOUNDATIONAL PROBLEM PRESENTED
    • A.  Determining Proper Classification (Evid C §§403, 405)  21.2
    • B.  When Evid C §403 Applies
      • 1.  Introduction  21.3
      • 2.  Relevancy  21.4
      • 3.  Personal Knowledge  21.5
      • 4.  Authenticity of Writing  21.6
      • 5.  Identity  21.7
    • C.  When Evid C §405 Applies  21.8
  • III.  COMPARING PROCEDURAL RULES
    • A.  Presence of Jury  21.9
    • B.  Procedure Under Evid C §403
      • 1.  Judge Determines Only Whether Prima Facie Showing Made  21.10
      • 2.  Conditional Admission if No Prima Facie Showing Made  21.11
      • 3.  Cautionary Instructions to Jury Under Evid C §403 Only  21.12
      • 4.  Exclusion of Evidence on Redetermination  21.13
      • 5.  Statute  21.14
    • C.  Procedure Under Evid C §405
      • 1.  Judge Alone Determines Admissibility  21.15
      • 2.  No Evid C §405 Conditional Admission  21.16
      • 3.  Separating Jury’s Role if Preliminary Fact Is Also Ultimate Fact  21.17
      • 4.  Statute  21.18
  • IV.  RESPONSES TO OBJECTION  21.19
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  21.20

22

Improper Impeachment

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  22.1
  • II.  WIDE LATITUDE ALLOWED FOR IMPEACHMENT
    • A.  Increased Freedom to Impeach  22.2
    • B.  Impeachment on Collateral Matter Permitted  22.3
    • C.  Impeachment by Cross-Examination Not Limited to Scope of Direct Examination  22.4
    • D.  Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement
      • 1.  Determination of Inconsistency  22.5
      • 2.  Permitted Without Showing Statement to Witness  22.5A
      • 3.  Permitted, in Judge’s Discretion, Even if Witness Has No Opportunity to Explain  22.6
  • III.  LIMITATIONS ON IMPEACHMENT
    • A.  Rules of General Applicability  22.7
    • B.  Rules Specifically Limiting Impeachment
      • 1.  Character Evidence  22.8
      • 2.  Absence of Religious Belief  22.9
      • 3.  Use of Texts for Impeachment  22.10
      • 4.  Noncompliance With CCP §2034 Expert Witness List  22.11
      • 5.  Judicial Arbitration  22.11A
  • IV.  STATUTE  22.12
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  22.13
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  22.14

23

Improper Rehabilitation

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  23.1
  • II.  WIDE LATITUDE ALLOWED FOR REHABILITATION  23.2
  • III.  LIMITATIONS ON REHABILITATION
    • A.  Rules of General Applicability  23.3
    • B.  Rules Specifically Limiting Rehabilitation  23.4
  • IV.  STATUTE  23.5
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  23.6
  • VI.  EFFECT OF FAILURE TO REHABILITATE  23.7
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  23.8

24

Excluding Secondary Evidence

  • I.  REPEAL OF BEST EVIDENCE RULE  24.1
  • II.  SECONDARY EVIDENCE RULE  24.2
  • III.  ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR EXCLUSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ACTION  24.3
  • IV.  ORAL TESTIMONY OF CONTENT OF WRITING GENERALLY NOT ADMISSIBLE  24.4
  • V.  PRINTED REPRESENTATIONS OF COMPUTER INFORMATION OR PROGRAM, OR OF VIDEO OR DIGITAL IMAGES, PRESUMED ACCURATE  24.5
  • VI.  STATUTE  24.6
  • VII.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  24.7
  • VIII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  24.8

25

Inadmissible Parol Evidence

  • I.  DEFINITION  25.1
  • II.  STATUTORY BASIS  25.2
  • III.  WHEN RULE APPLIES; CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION  25.3
  • IV.  WHO MAY INVOKE RULE  25.4
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS TO RULE
    • A.  To Prove Mistake, Illegality, or Fraud  25.5
    • B.  To Prove Invalidity  25.6
    • C.  To Explain Terms  25.7
    • D.  To Resolve Ambiguity  25.8
    • E.  Several Writings Constituting Agreement  25.9
    • F.  Consistent Additional Terms  25.10
    • G.  Subsequent Modifications  25.11
  • VI.  REQUIREMENT OF PROMPT OBJECTION  25.12
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  25.13

26

Cross-Examination Exceeds Scope of Direct Examination

  • I.  TYPES OF CROSS-EXAMINATION  26.1
  • II.  STATEMENT OF RULE
    • A.  Statutory Provisions Establishing Restricted Scope  26.2
    • B.  Unlimited Scope for Impeachment Cross-Examination  26.3
    • C.  Determining “Scope”  26.4
  • III.  “OPENING THE DOOR” EXCEPTION
    • A.  Limited Nature of Exception  26.5
    • B.  When “Curative Admissibility” Exception Applies
      • 1.  Offsetting Highly Prejudicial Evidence: Curative Admissibility  26.6
      • 2.  Putting Evidence in Proper Context: Rule of Completeness  26.7
  • IV.  ADDITIONAL PROTECTION BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION  26.8
  • V.  RELATED OBJECTIONS TO RECROSS- AND REDIRECT EXAMINATION  26.9
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  26.10
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  26.11

27

Corpus Delicti Not Proved

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  27.1
  • II.  PROOF REQUIRED  27.2
  • III.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Judge’s Determination Regarding Corpus Delicti  27.3
    • B.  Trial Jury’s Determination
      • 1.  Separate Determination Required  27.4
      • 2.  Determination Regarding Corpus Delicti  27.5
      • 3.  Determination Regarding Guilt  27.6
      • 4.  Difficulty of Separating Jury’s Determinations  27.7

28

Illegally Obtained Evidence

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  28.1
  • II.  SUMMARY  28.2
  • III.  SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
    • A.  Constitutional Provisions  28.3
    • B.  Applicability
      • 1.  Criminal Cases  28.3A
      • 2.  Civil Cases  28.4
      • 3.  Quasi-Criminal Cases  28.5
      • 4.  Administrative Proceedings  28.6
  • IV.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE UNDER EVID C §352  28.7
  • V.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY FRAUD AND DECEIT  28.8
  • VI.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY OUTRAGEOUS OR SHOCKING METHODS  28.9
  • VII.  EXCLUDING ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS  28.10
  • VIII.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS  28.11
  • IX.  PROCEDURE  28.12
  • X.  STATING THE OBJECTION
    • A.  Illegal Search and Seizure  28.13
    • B.  Illegally Obtained Confessions and Admissions  28.14
    • C.  Other Illegally Obtained Evidence  28.15

29

Objecting to Misconduct

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  29.1
  • II.  MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL
    • A.  Definition  29.2
    • B.  Examples of Misconduct of Counsel
      • 1.  Primary Categories  29.3
      • 2.  Misconduct Before Trial or During Voir Dire Examination  29.4
      • 3.  Misconduct During Opening Statement  29.5
      • 4.  Misconduct During Examination of Witnesses  29.6
      • 5.  Misconduct During Argument  29.7
      • 6.  Misconduct After Trial  29.8
    • C.  Determining Prejudicial Effect  29.9
    • D.  Remedies
      • 1.  Objection
        • a.  Purpose  29.10
        • b.  Timeliness  29.11
        • c.  Objecting to Misconduct  29.12
        • d.  Laying Foundation for Misconduct That Occurred Without Judge’s Knowledge  29.13
      • 2.  Requesting Curative Admonition  29.14
      • 3.  Contempt  29.15
      • 4.  Motion for Mistrial  29.16
      • 5.  Motion for New Trial  29.17
      • 6.  Appeal  29.18
    • E.  Alternatives to Objecting  29.19
    • F.  Stating the Objection  29.20
  • III.  MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE
    • A.  Standards of Conduct  29.21
    • B.  Examples of Misconduct of Judge  29.22
      • 1.  Abuse of Power to Comment on Evidence  29.23
      • 2.  Abuse of Power to Examine Witnesses or Prospective Witnesses  29.24
      • 3.  Interference With Production of Proof  29.25
      • 4.  Coercive Actions  29.26
      • 5.  Disparagement of Counsel, Witness, or Party  29.27
    • C.  Remedies
      • 1.  Objection  29.28
      • 2.  Motion for Mistrial  29.29
      • 3.  Motion for New Trial  29.30
      • 4.  Appeal  29.31
    • D.  Alternatives to Objecting  29.32
    • E.  Stating the Objection  29.33
  • IV.  MISCONDUCT OF JURORS
    • A.  Standards of Conduct  29.34
    • B.  Examples of Misconduct of Jurors
      • 1.  Concealing Information During Voir Dire Examination  29.35
      • 2.  Receiving Evidence Out of Court
        • a.  General Restrictions  29.36
        • b.  Specific Prohibitions
          • (1)  Independent Investigations or Research  29.37
          • (2)  Independent Experiments  29.38
          • (3)  Unauthorized Discussions  29.39
          • (4)  Personal Knowledge of Facts  29.40
          • (5)  Personal Knowledge of Law  29.41
          • (6)  Unauthorized Matter in Jury Room  29.42
      • 3.  Arriving at Verdict by Chance or by Quotient  29.43
      • 4.  Inattentiveness During Trial  29.44
      • 5.  Failure to Deliberate  29.44A
    • C.  Remedies
      • 1.  Before Verdict Rendered  29.45
      • 2.  After Verdict Rendered  29.46
    • D.  Alternatives to Objecting  29.47
    • E.  Stating the Objection
      • 1.  Before Verdict Rendered  29.48
      • 2.  After Verdict Rendered  29.49

30

Unduly Inflammatory

  • I.  DEFINITION  30.1
  • II.  ANALYSIS  30.2
  • III.  TACTICS; PROCEDURE  30.3
  • IV.  ILLUSTRATIONS
    • A.  Discretion Upheld  30.4
    • B.  Abuse of Discretion  30.5
  • V.  STATUTE  30.6
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  30.7

31

Excluding Relevant Evidence Under Evid C §352

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  31.1
  • II.  APPLICABILITY  31.2
    • A.  Unduly Prejudicial
      • 1.  Civil Trials  31.3
      • 2.  Criminal Trials  31.4
    • B.  Unduly Time Consuming  31.5
    • C.  Cumulative Evidence  31.6
      • 1.  Analysis  31.7
      • 2.  Illustrations  31.8
      • 3.  Tactics  31.9
      • 4.  Stating the Objection  31.10
    • D.  Confuses Issues or Misleads Jury  31.11
  • III.  DURING TRIAL
    • A.  Court’s Balancing Factors  31.12
    • B.  Responses
      • 1.  Motion to Strike  31.13
      • 2.  Offer of Proof  31.14
      • 3.  Argument  31.15
      • 4.  Record for Appeal  31.16
  • IV.  PROCEDURE  31.17
  • V.  STATUTE  31.18
  • VI.  INVOKING JUDGE’S AUTHORITY  31.19

32

Other Policy Exclusions of Evidence

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  32.1
  • II.  EVIDENCE OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
    • A.  Offer of Compromise Payment in Civil Cases  32.2
    • B.  Acceptance of Compromise Payment in Civil Cases  32.3
    • C.  Offer to Plead Guilty  32.4
  • III.  EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT SAFETY MEASURES  32.5
  • IV.  EVIDENCE REGARDING LIABILITY INSURANCE  32.6
  • V.  MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY  32.6A
  • VI.  EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR ACTS OR OCCURRENCES  32.7
  • VII.  LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY INSTRUCTION  32.8
  • VIII.  MISCELLANEOUS OTHER STATUTES  32.9
  • IX.  EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS
    • A.  Collateral Source Rule  32.10
    • B.  Limits on Application of Rule
      • 1.  Action Against Public Entity  32.11
      • 2.  Action Against Health Care Provider  32.12
      • 3.  Malingering Claim  32.13
      • 4.  FELA Action in State Court  32.14
  • X.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  32.15
  • XI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  32.16

33

Privileges: General Rules and Considerations

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Overview of Privileges  33.1
    • B.  Applicability  33.2
    • C.  Exclusively Statutory Basis  33.3
    • D.  Confidentiality Distinct From Privilege  33.3A
  • II.  EXERCISING PRIVILEGES
    • A.  Determining Who Can Invoke or Waive
      • 1.  Meaning of “Holder”  33.4
      • 2.  Claim or Assertion  33.5
      • 3.  Waiver  33.6
      • 4.  Remedies for Erroneous Denial  33.7
    • B.  Privileges in Preparing for Trial
      • 1.  Role of Counsel  33.8
      • 2.  Discovery Proceedings  33.9
      • 3.  Selection of Privileges to Be Invoked  33.10
    • C.  Assertion of Privilege at Trial
      • 1.  Claim of Privilege  33.11
      • 2.  Use of Privileged Writing to Refresh Memory  33.12
      • 3.  Avoiding Need to Claim Privilege Before Jury  33.13
      • 4.  Exclusion of Privileged Information in Absence of Claimant
        • a.  Privileges Covered by Exclusion Procedure  33.14
        • b.  Evid C §916 Requirements for Exclusion of Information Subject to Claim  33.15
        • c.  Exceptions  33.16
    • D.  Upholding Privilege Contested at Trial
      • 1.  Procedure for Ruling on Privilege  33.17
      • 2.  Burden of Proof  33.18
      • 3.  Offer of Proof  33.19
    • E.  Evid C §913 Protection Against Comment and Inference  33.20
    • F.  Remedies for Erroneous Denial of Privilege
      • 1.  Party’s Assertion of Error  33.21
      • 2.  Seeking Extraordinary Writ
        • a.  Privilege Claimed by Witness  33.22
        • b.  Privilege Claimed by Person Other Than Witness  33.23
      • 3.  Objection to Subsequent Use of Erroneously Compelled Disclosure  33.24
  • III.  OPPOSITION TO PRIVILEGES
    • A.  Before Trial  33.25
    • B.  Response to Assertion of Privilege at Trial
      • 1.  Controverting Privilege  33.26
      • 2.  Offer of Proof  33.27
    • C.  Subsequent Admission of Evidence Excluded as Privileged in Absence of Claimant  33.28
    • D.  Comment on Opponent’s Failure to Explain or Deny Evidence  33.29
    • E.  Remedy for Erroneous Allowance of Privilege  33.30
  • IV.  STATUTES  33.31

34

Attorney-Client Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  34.1
  • II.  DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE  34.2
  • III.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Attorney-Client Relationship
      • 1.  Professional Consultation  34.3
      • 2.  Who Is the Client?
        • a.  Individual as Client  34.4
        • b.  Corporation as Client  34.5
          • (1)  Attorney as Witness  34.5A
          • (2)  Current and Former Corporate Employees  34.6
          • (3)  Upjohn Decision  34.7
        • c.  Joint Clients  34.7A
      • 3.  Who Is the Attorney?  34.8
    • B.  Communication  34.9
    • C.  Confidentiality  34.10
    • D.  Mediation Confidentiality  34.10A
  • IV.  WHO CAN CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Client or Client’s Representative  34.11
    • B.  Attorney’s Duty to Claim  34.12
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  34.13
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS  34.14
    • A.  Based on Nature of Attorney-Client Relationship
      • 1.  Assistance in Crime or Fraud  34.15
      • 2.  Breach of Attorney-Client Duty  34.16
      • 3.  Subsequent Litigation Between Joint Clients  34.17
    • B.  Claims Through Deceased Client
      • 1.  Issues Between Claimants  34.18
      • 2.  Deceased Client’s Written Instrument  34.19
  • VI.  TERMINATION BY DEATH, DISSOLUTION, OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Client’s Death  34.20
    • B.  Effect of Organization Client’s Dissolution  34.21
    • C.  Waiver
      • 1.  Disclosure of Significant Part of Communication  34.22
      • 2.  Failure to Claim Privilege  34.22A
      • 3.  Joint Defense Agreements and Disclosure  34.22B
  • VII.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  34.23
    • B.  Burden of Proof  34.24
  • VIII.  STATUTES  34.25
  • IX.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  34.26
  • X.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Client-Witness  34.27
    • B.  By Attorney-Witness  34.28
    • C.  By Trial Counsel  34.29

35

Work Product Doctrine

  • I.  DEFINITION AND PURPOSE  35.1
  • II.  DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE  35.2
  • III.  TYPES OF WORK PRODUCT
    • A.  Civil Cases  35.3
    • B.  Criminal Cases  35.4
  • IV.  WHO MAY CLAIM PROTECTION?  35.5
  • V.  DURATION AND AVAILABILITY OF PROTECTION  35.6
  • VI.  EXCEPTIONS  35.7
  • VII.  WAIVER  35.8
  • VIII.  IN CAMERA REVIEW IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES  35.9
  • IX.  STATUTES  35.10
  • X.  STATING THE CLAIM  35.11

36

Physician-Patient Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  36.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Physician-Patient Relationship  36.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  36.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  36.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?
    • A.  Patient or Patient’s Representative  36.5
    • B.  Physician’s Duty to Claim  36.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  36.7
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS  36.8
    • A.  Patient-Litigant  36.9
    • B.  Criminal and Quasi-Criminal
      • 1.  Criminal Proceedings  36.10
      • 2.  Civil Damages for Patient’s Conduct  36.11
      • 3.  Disciplinary Proceedings  36.12
      • 4.  Child Abuse  36.13
    • C.  When Patient’s Competence Is at Issue  36.14
    • D.  Nature of Physician-Patient Relationship
      • 1.  Assistance in Crime or Tort  36.15
      • 2.  Breach of Physician-Patient Duty  36.16
    • E.  Claims Through Deceased Patient  36.17
    • F.  Public Record  36.18
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Patient’s Death  36.19
    • B.  Waiver  36.20
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  36.21
    • B.  Burden of Proof  36.22
  • VII.  STATUTES  36.23
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  36.24
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  36.25
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  36.26

37

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  37.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Psychotherapist-Patient Relationship  37.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  37.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  37.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?
    • A.  Patient or Patient’s Representative  37.5
    • B.  Psychotherapist’s Duty to Claim  37.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  37.7
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS
    • A.  Patient-Litigant
      • 1.  Civil Trials  37.8
      • 2.  Criminal Trials  37.9
    • B.  Psychotherapist Considers Patient to Be Dangerous  37.10
    • C.  Nature of Psychotherapist-Patient Relationship
      • 1.  Assistance in Crime or Tort  37.11
      • 2.  Breach of Psychotherapist-Patient Duty  37.12
    • D.  Claims Through Deceased Patient  37.13
    • E.  Public Record  37.14
    • F.  Child Abuse  37.15
    • G.  Medical Board Investigation  37.15A
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Patient’s Death  37.16
    • B.  Waiver  37.17
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  37.18
    • B.  Burden of Proof  37.19
  • VII.  STATUTES  37.20
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  37.21
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  37.22
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  37.23

38

Sexual Assault Counselor-Victim Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  38.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Counselor-Victim Relationship  38.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  38.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  38.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Victim or Victim’s Representative  38.5
    • B.  Counselor’s Duty to Claim  38.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  38.7
  • IV.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Victim’s Death  38.8
    • B.  Waiver  38.9
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Dispute Over Nature of Communication; Procedure  38.10
    • B.  Other Issues  38.11
    • C.  Burden of Proof  38.12
  • VI.  STATUTES  38.13
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  38.14
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  38.15
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  38.16

39

Domestic Violence Counselor-Victim Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  39.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Counselor-Victim Relationship  39.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  39.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  39.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Victim or Victim’s Representative  39.5
    • B.  Counselor’s Duty to Claim  39.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  39.7
  • IV.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Victim’s Death  39.8
    • B.  Waiver  39.9
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Court-Compelled Disclosure; Procedure  39.10
    • B.  Other Issues  39.11
    • C.  Burden of Proof  39.12
  • VI.  STATUTES  39.13
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  39.14
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  39.15
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  39.16

39A

Human Trafficking Caseworker-Victim Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  39A.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Caseworker-Victim Relationship  39A.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  39A.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  39A.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Victim or Victim’s Representative  39A.5
    • B.  Caseworker’s Duty to Claim  39A.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  39A.7
  • IV.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Dispute Over Nature of Communication; Procedure  39A.8
    • B.  Other Issues  39A.9
    • C.  Burden of Proof  39A.10
  • V.  STATUTES  39A.11
  • VI.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  39A.12
  • VII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  39A.13
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  39A.14

40

Privilege for Confidential Marital Communications

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  40.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Valid Marriage or Domestic Partnership  40.2
    • B.  Communication  40.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  40.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Either Spouse or Domestic Partner  40.5
    • B.  Guardian or Conservator  40.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  40.7
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS
    • A.  Assistance in Crime or Fraud  40.8
    • B.  Communication Offered by Defendant Spouse in Criminal Proceeding  40.9
    • C.  Particular Proceedings  40.10
      • 1.  Spouse’s Competence Is at Issue  40.11
      • 2.  Litigation Between Spouses  40.12
      • 3.  Litigation Between Surviving Spouse and Claimant Through Deceased Spouse  40.13
      • 4.  Juvenile Court Proceedings  40.14
      • 5.  Spouse Charged With Certain Crimes  40.15
      • 6.  Law Enforcement Administrative Investigations and Hearings  40.15A
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Spouse’s Death  40.16
    • B.  Waiver  40.17
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  40.18
    • B.  Burden of Proof  40.19
  • VII.  STATUTES  40.20
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  40.21
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  40.22
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  40.23

41

Privilege Not to Testify Against Spouse

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  41.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Valid Marriage  41.2
    • B.  Demand for Testimony “Against” Spouse
      • 1.  Testimony “For” Spouse Not Privileged  41.3
      • 2.  Testimony “Against” Party Spouse
        • a.  Two-Party Action  41.4
        • b.  Multiple Parties Including One Spouse  41.5
        • c.  Both Spouses Are Parties  41.6
      • 3.  Testimony “Against” Nonparty Spouse  41.7
  • III.  ONLY WITNESS SPOUSE CAN CLAIM  41.8
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS  41.9
    • A.  Litigation Between Spouses  41.10
    • B.  Spouse’s Competence Is at Issue  41.11
    • C.  Juvenile Court Proceedings  41.12
    • D.  Spouse Charged With Certain Crimes  41.13
    • E.  Criminal Act Occurred Before Marriage of Spouses  41.14
    • F.  Certain Proceedings Brought by One Spouse Against Other or to Enforce Child Support Obligations  41.15
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE OR BY WAIVER
    • A.  Dissolution of Marriage  41.16
    • B.  Waiver
      • 1.  Waiver by Testimony  41.17
        • a.  Testimony for Spouse  41.18
        • b.  Testimony Against Party Spouse  41.19
        • c.  Testimony Against Nonparty Spouse  41.20
        • d.  Extent of Waiver  41.21
      • 2.  Action or Defense for Immediate Benefit of Spouse  41.22
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  41.23
    • B.  Burden of Proof  41.24
  • VII.  STATUTES  41.25
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  41.26
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  If Witness’s Spouse Is Party
      • 1.  By Witness  41.27
      • 2.  By Trial Counsel for Party Spouse  41.28
    • B.  If Particular Question Calls for Testimony Against Witness’s Nonparty Spouse
      • 1.  By Witness  41.29
      • 2.  By Trial Counsel  41.30

42

Privilege Not to Be Called as Witness Against Spouse

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  42.1
  • II.  EFFECT OF MULTIPLE PARTIES  42.2
  • III.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Valid Marriage  42.3
    • B.  Witness’s Spouse Must Be Party  42.4
    • C.  Witness Called by Adverse Party
      • 1.  Criminal Actions
        • a.  Witness Called by Prosecutor  42.5
        • b.  Witness Called by Codefendant  42.6
      • 2.  Civil Actions
        • a.  Two-Party Action  42.7
        • b.  Multiple Parties Including One Spouse  42.8
        • c.  Both Spouses Are Parties  42.9
  • IV.  EXERCISE OF PRIVILEGE  42.10
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS
    • A.  Witness Called in Good Faith Ignorance of Marital Relationship  42.11
    • B.  Proceedings in Which Privilege Is Not Available  42.12
  • VI.  TERMINATION BY DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE OR BY WAIVER
    • A.  Dissolution of Marriage  42.13
    • B.  Waiver
      • 1.  Acquiescence in Being Called by Adverse Party  42.14
      • 2.  Waiver by Testimony  42.15
      • 3.  Action or Defense for Immediate Benefit of Spouse  42.16
  • VII.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  42.17
    • B.  Burden of Proof  42.18
  • VIII.  STATUTES  42.19
  • IX.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  42.20
  • X.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  42.21
    • B.  By Trial Counsel for Party Spouse  42.22

43

Privilege for Official Information

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  43.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Information Acquired by Public Employee  43.2
    • B.  Confidentiality  43.3
    • C.  Grounds for Nondisclosure
      • 1.  Federal or California Statute  43.4
      • 2.  Military and State Secrets  43.5
      • 3.  Balancing of Necessities  43.6
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  43.7
  • IV.  EFFECT IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
    • A.  Order or Finding Adverse to Prosecution  43.8
    • B.  Exceptions to Adverse Finding Rule
      • 1.  Privilege Invoked by Non-California Public Entity  43.9
      • 2.  Federal Statute Forbidding Disclosure  43.10
      • 3.  Information to Support Search Warrant  43.11
  • V.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER  43.12
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  43.13
    • B.  Burden of Proof  43.14
  • VII.  STATUTES  43.15
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  43.16
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  43.17
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  43.18
  • X.  MOTION FOR ORDER OR FINDING ADVERSE TO PROSECUTION  43.19

44

Privilege for Identity of Informer

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  44.1
  • II.  PRETRIAL PROCEDURES CONCERNING PRIVILEGE FOR IDENTITY OF INFORMER  44.2
  • III.  PROCEDURES WHEN INFORMER PRIVILEGE ARISES DURING TRIAL
    • A.  Information From Informer
      • 1.  Purported Disclosure of Law Violation  44.3
      • 2.  Recipient of Information  44.4
      • 3.  Confidentiality  44.5
    • B.  Grounds for Nondisclosure of Identity  44.6
    • C.  Who Can Claim?  44.7
    • D.  Termination and Waiver  44.8
    • E.  Hearings and Ruling on Privilege
      • 1.  Privilege Raised  44.9
      • 2.  In Camera Hearing; Final Hearing  44.10
      • 3.  Burden of Proof  44.11
  • IV.  STATUTES  44.12
  • V.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  44.13
  • VI.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  44.14
    • B.  By Prosecutor  44.15
  • VII.  DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ORDER OR FINDING ADVERSE TO PROSECUTION  44.16

45

Trade Secrets Privilege

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  45.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Trade Secret  45.2
    • B.  Privilege Allowed Only if No Injustice Will Result  45.3
  • III.  WHO MAY CLAIM?  45.4
  • IV.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER  45.5
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  45.6
    • B.  Burden of Proof  45.7
  • VI.  STATUTE  45.8
  • VII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  45.9
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  45.10

46

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  46.1
  • II.  NATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS  46.2
  • III.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Demand for Testimony or Communication Belonging to Witness  46.3
    • B.  Evidence Would Subject Witness to Criminal Penalty  46.4
    • C.  Connection Between Evidence and Punishable Act  46.5
  • IV.  WRITINGS THAT QUALIFY  46.6
  • V.  CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Who Can Claim?  46.7
    • B.  Form of Claim  46.8
    • C.  When to Raise Privilege; Questioning Before Jury  46.9
    • D.  Court Has No Duty to Warn Self-Represented Criminal Defendant of Privilege  46.10
  • VI.  RESPONSES OF PARTY OPPOSING PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL CASE  46.11
  • VII.  RULE AGAINST COMMENT ON OR INFERENCE FROM EXERCISE OF PRIVILEGE  46.12
  • VIII.  TERMINATION OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Prosecution Barred  46.13
    • B.  Immunity
      • 1.  Principal Immunity Provisions  46.14
        • a.  Transactional and Use Immunity in Criminal Proceedings  46.15
        • b.  Immunity in Civil Cases  46.16
      • 2.  Other Immunity Provisions  46.17
      • 3.  Criminal Defense Witness Immunity  46.18
    • C.  Waiver  46.19
  • IX.  BURDEN OF PROOF AND RULING; WRIT REVIEW  46.20
  • X.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION  46.21

47

Privilege of Defendant in Criminal Case Not to Be Called and Not to Testify

  • I.  NATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS  47.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Criminal Prosecution of Defendant  47.2
    • B.  Testimonial or Communicative Evidence  47.3
  • III.  DECIDING WHETHER TO TESTIFY  47.4
  • IV.  ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE  47.5
  • V.  RULE AGAINST COMMENT ON OR INFERENCE FROM FAILURE TO TESTIFY  47.6
  • VI.  WAIVER  47.7
  • VII.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE  47.8
  • VIII.  STATUTE  47.9
  • IX.  STATING OBJECTIONS BASED ON PRIVILEGE  47.10

48

Journalist’s Immunity From Contempt

  • I.  NATURE OF JOURNALIST’S “SHIELD LAW”  48.1
    • A.  Federal and State Constitutional Basis for Privilege Not to Disclose Information
      • 1.  Historical Development of Privilege  48.2
      • 2.  Showing Required to Compel Testimony of Journalist  48.3
      • 3.  Guidelines for Issuing Subpoenas to Journalists  48.4
      • 4.  Interpretation of Privilege by California Supreme Court  48.5
    • B.  Constitutional and Statutory Sources for California’s Immunity From Contempt  48.6
      • 1.  Requirements
        • a.  Who Is Considered a “Journalist”?  48.7
        • b.  Information Covered by Immunity  48.8
        • c.  When Immunity May Be Claimed  48.9
      • 2.  Scope of Immunity
        • a.  Civil Trials  48.10
        • b.  Criminal Trials  48.11
  • II.  ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE OR CLAIM OF IMMUNITY  48.12
    • A.  Civil Trials  48.13
    • B.  Criminal Trials
      • 1.  Triggering Delaney Protection  48.14
      • 2.  Applying Delaney Balancing Test  48.15
      • 3.  [Deleted]  48.16
  • III.  WAIVER  48.17
  • IV.  STATING THE OBJECTION  48.18
  • V.  RESPONSE IF JOURNALIST IS CITED FOR CONTEMPT  48.19
  • VI.  CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION; STATUTE  48.20

49

Voter’s Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  49.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Public Election; Secret Ballot  49.2
    • B.  Tenor of Vote Permitted  49.3
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  49.4
  • IV.  EXCEPTION FOR ILLEGAL VOTE  49.5
  • V.  WAIVER THROUGH DISCLOSURE  49.6
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  49.7
    • B.  Burden of Proof  49.8
  • VII.  STATUTE  49.9
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  49.10
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  49.11
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  49.12

50

Penitent’s Privilege

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  50.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Cleric  50.2
    • B.  Penitent  50.3
    • C.  Communication  50.4
    • D.  Confidentiality  50.5
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  50.6
  • IV.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER
    • A.  Death of Penitent  50.7
    • B.  Waiver  50.8
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  50.9
    • B.  Burden of Proof  50.10
  • VI.  STATUTE  50.11
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  50.12
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  50.13
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  50.14

51

Cleric’s Privilege

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  51.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Cleric  51.2
    • B.  Penitent  51.3
    • C.  Communication  51.4
    • D.  Confidentiality  51.5
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  51.6
  • IV.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER
    • A.  Death of Cleric  51.7
    • B.  Waiver  51.8
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  51.9
    • B.  Burden of Proof  51.10
  • VI.  STATUTE  51.11
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  51.12
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  51.13
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  51.14

52

Motion to Strike

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  52.1
  • II.  WHO CAN MAKE MOTION TO STRIKE? USES OF MOTION  52.2
  • III.  WHEN MOTION TO STRIKE IS PROPER
    • A.  Nonresponsive Answer to Proper Question  52.3
    • B.  Improper Question Answered Too Quickly for Objection  52.4
    • C.  Failure to Prove Foundation for Conditionally Admitted Evidence  52.5
    • D.  Admissible Evidence That Becomes Inadmissible  52.6
  • IV.  HOW MOTION MUST BE MADE
    • A.  Timeliness; Request for Admonition  52.7
    • B.  Specification of Particular Evidence to Be Stricken  52.8
    • C.  Specification of Grounds  52.9
    • D.  Striking by Judge on Own Motion  52.10
  • V.  POSSIBLE SANCTIONS: ADMONITION, MISCONDUCT, MISTRIAL  52.11
  • VI.  EFFECT ON TRIAL RECORD OF STRIKING EVIDENCE  52.12
  • VII.  FORFEITURE
    • A.  Failure to Make Proper Motion  52.13
    • B.  Failure to Obtain Ruling  52.14
  • VIII.  DECIDING WHETHER TO MAKE MOTION
    • A.  Tactical Advantages and Disadvantages  52.15
    • B.  Alternatives to Motion to Strike  52.16
  • IX.  EFFECT AT TRIAL OF FAILURE TO OBJECT TO NONRESPONSIVE ANSWER GIVEN DURING DEPOSITION  52.17
  • X.  STATING MOTION AND REQUEST FOR ADMONITION  52.18

53

Jury Admonitions

  • I.  ADMONITIONS
    • A.  During Trial  53.1
    • B.  As Part of Jury Instructions  53.2
  • II.  COMMON USE OF ADMONITIONS
    • A.  Misconduct  53.3
    • B.  Stricken or Excluded Evidence  53.4
    • C.  Evidence Admitted for Limited Purpose
      • 1.  Counsel’s Request for Limiting Admonition or Instruction  53.5
      • 2.  Sample Limiting Instructions  53.6
    • D.  Exercise of Privilege  53.7

54

Motion for Continuance

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  54.1
  • II.  GOOD CAUSE REQUIRED
    • A.  Civil Trials  54.2
    • B.  Criminal Trials  54.3
  • III.  CONTINUANCE BASED ON SURPRISE EVIDENCE
    • A.  Surprise Must Be Genuine  54.4
    • B.  Relevant Opposing Evidence Must Be Available  54.5
    • C.  Opposing Evidence Must Be Disputed  54.6
  • IV.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Civil Cases
      • 1.  Request for Continuance  54.7
      • 2.  Stipulation to Avoid Continuance  54.8
      • 3.  Factors Considered by Judge in Ruling on Continuance Motion  54.9
      • 4.  Allowing Depositions  54.10
      • 5.  Awarding Costs  54.11
      • 6.  Jury Fees  54.12
      • 7.  Consideration of Ruling on Appeal  54.13
      • 8.  Effect of Failure to Make Motion for Continuance on Motion for New Trial  54.14
    • B.  Criminal Cases  54.15
      • 1.  Conditional Examination of Witnesses  54.16
      • 2.  Writ Review  54.17

55

Extraordinary Writs

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  55.1
  • II.  USUALLY NOT OBTAINABLE TO CORRECT RULINGS ON EVIDENCE  55.2
  • III.  WHEN OBTAINABLE
    • A.  To Enforce Privilege  55.3
    • B.  To Protect Right to Privacy  55.4
    • C.  To Stay Contempt Order  55.5
    • D.  To Overcome Shield Law Order  55.6
  • IV.  OTHER EXCEPTIONS  55.7

56

Motion for Mistrial

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  56.1
  • II.  GROUNDS
    • A.  Irreparable Prejudicial Incident  56.2
    • B.  Irregularity in Proceedings  56.3
  • III.  TRIAL JUDGE’S DISCRETION  56.4
  • IV.  TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS  56.5
  • V.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Irreparable Prejudicial Incident
      • 1.  Incident Constituting Misconduct  56.6
      • 2.  Incident Not Constituting Misconduct  56.7
    • B.  Irregularity in Proceedings  56.8

57

Contempt

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  57.1
  • II.  DEFINITION  57.2
  • III.  TYPES OF CONTEMPT
    • A.  Direct, Indirect, and Hybrid Contempt  57.3
    • B.  Civil and Criminal Contempt  57.3A
  • IV.  COMMON EXAMPLES OF CONTEMPTUOUS TRIAL CONDUCT  57.4
  • V.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Who Can Bring and Punish Contempt?  57.5
    • B.  Procedures Under CCP §1209
      • 1.  Direct Contempt  57.6
      • 2.  Indirect Contempt  57.7
      • 3.  Hybrid Contempt  57.8
      • 4.  Sentence  57.9
    • C.  Procedures Under Pen C §166  57.10
    • D.  Stay of Contempt Sentence  57.11
  • VI.  REVIEW BY APPELLATE COURT  57.12

About the Authors

Edwin A. Heafey, Jr. was a Director in the California firm of Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, with offices in Oakland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, where he specialized in civil litigation in both state and federal courts. He was a graduate of Stanford Law School. Mr. Heafey was a member of the American College of Trial Lawyers, a member and past president of the American Board of Trial Advocates, and a member of the International Society of Barristers. He taught trial practice at University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, for 17 years. Mr. Heafey had been listed in The Best Lawyers in America (Woodward/White, 1987–2000).

Stephen G. Blitch was a partner in Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May (where the late Ed Heafey was his esteemed colleague and good friend) and later Reed Smith LLP. He tried dozens of civil cases in state and federal courts throughout California and in several other states. Mr. Blitch lectured frequently on the subjects of trial evidence and trial practice, and taught at the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA). He left his active law practice in 2010 and practiced mediation until 2016 with ADR Services, Inc. He is a graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, College of Environmental Design (Architecture) and the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Mr. Blitch was a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and a member of the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA), the Association of Business Trial Lawyers, a member of the Alameda County Bar Association and past chair of its Trial Practice Section, a member of the Litigation Section of the California State Bar Association, and a member of the Bar Association of San Francisco.

Marshall C. Wallace is a partner in the firm of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP, in San Francisco. He is a civil trial lawyer, focusing on complex business cases, including business tort, unfair competition, real estate, financial services, insurance, and land use litigation. He has handled dozens of jury trials, bench trials, arbitrations, expedited injunction proceedings and class actions. He graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1986, receiving a J.D. degree from the School of Law and an M.B.A. degree from the School of Business. He graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Princeton University’s School of Engineering and Applied Science in 1981. Mr. Wallace is a member of the Association of Business Trial Lawyers, the Trial Practice Section of the Alameda County Bar Association, and the Litigation Section of the California State Bar Association.

Keith D. Yandell is the General Counsel at DoorDash, Inc., in San Francisco. He co-founded the litigation group at Uber Technologies, Inc., where he worked as Director of Litigation. Prior to that, Mr. Yandell was a partner at the firm of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP, in the firm’s Litigation Department. He earned a degree in political science (with Highest Honors) from the University of California, Davis, and his law degree from the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law. Mr. Yandell has lectured on a wide variety of topics, including the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and certification of class actions. Mr. Yandell’s extensive courtroom experience includes a 5-week trial in which he obtained a jury verdict in his clients’ favor and a seven-figure damages award, including an award of punitive damages.

Selected Developments

September 2018

Attorney-Client Communications

If material protected by the attorney-client privilege inadvertently falls into the hands of opposing counsel, and that counsel does not take the affirmative actions outlined in State Compensation Ins. Fund v WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 CA4th 644, 656, that counsel may be disqualified. See McDermott Will & Emery LLP v Superior Court (2017) 10 CA5th 1083, 1119. See §34.22.

When a trustee is asserting the attorney-client privilege, the “client” is the office of the trustee, not a particular trustee. See Fiduciary Trust Int’l v Klein (2017) 9 CA5th 1184, 1195. See §34.11.

The attorney-client privilege did not extend to communications among the attorney, client, and a public relations consultant, because those communications were not reasonably necessary for the legal representation in the lawsuit. Behunin v Superior Court (2017) 9 CA5th 833, 843. See §34.3.

The attorney-client privilege does not categorically protect everything in an attorney’s billing invoice from disclosure, but it does protect the confidentiality of invoices for work in pending and active legal matters. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v Superior Court (2017) 2 C5th 282, 297. See §34.9.

Legislative changes to Evid C §956 provide that the exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to legal services that comply with state or local laws on medicial or adult-use cannabis. Confidential communications provided for the purpose of rendering those services are confidential communications between client and lawyer, as defined in Evid C §952, provided the lawyer also advises the client on conflicts with respect to federal law. See Stats 2017, ch 530, §2 (AB 1159), effective January 1, 2018. See §34.15.

Confrontation

The California Supreme Court applied the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crawford v Washington (2004) 541 US 36, 59, 124 S Ct 1354, and held that the jury was improperly asked to consider a deceased person’s confession for its truth in violation of the confrontation clause. People v Hopson (2017) 3 C5th 424, 431. See §19.9A.

Expert Witnesses

In David v Hernandez (2017) 13 CA5th 692, 698, the expert’s opinion testimony on whether defendant was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the collision was a matter of speculation and thus properly excluded. See §16.5.

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to qualify an expert in database management and analysis in ABM Indus. Overtime Cases (2018) 19 CA5th 277, 292. See §20.6.

Introduction of expert testimony in People v Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 CA5th 501 was rendered inadmissible by the California Supreme Court decision in People v Sanchez (2016) 63 C4th 665. See §20.9.

Hearsay Exceptions

The court in People v Brown (2017) 14 CA5th 320, 332, applied the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule to a minor who was protected as a trafficking victim and thus could not be charged. See §19.16.

The court in People v Gallardo (2017) 18 CA5th 51, 70, held that the jailhouse statements defendant made to informants that identified his codefendants as the shooter and the driver of the car from which shots were fired were improperly admitted under the hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest. See §19.18.

Another case has held that forensic reports of blood alcohol test results are admissible in DMV administrative hearings as public employee records under Evid C §1280. See Murphey v Shiomoto (2017) 13 CA5th 1052 in §19.27.

The California Supreme Court in People v Brooks (2017) 3 C5th 1, 37, held that statements that the victim feared the defendant were relevant to the fear element of stalking and thus fell under the hearsay exception for statements of mental or physical state under Evid C §1250. See §19.24.

In People v Rodriguez (2017) 16 CA5th 355, 377, the court found that a computer-generated report of the Global Positioning System (GPS) data generated by an ankle monitor did not consist of statements, and thus did not constitute hearsay. See §19.3.

The court in In re Auto. Antitrust Cases I & II (2016) 1 CA5th 127 found that meeting minutes were a “textbook example” of an adoptive admission; by engaging in the review and revision process, the party clearly manifested belief in the accuracy of the records. See §19.14.

Misconduct

In People v Forrest (2017) 7 CA5th 1074, 1081, the court found that the defendant forfeited his claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object or seek admonition to the jury, and that any prosecutor misstatements of the law were harmless. See §29.7.

Lay Opinion

A lay witness may recount his impressions and conclusions based on participation as a percipient witness at a meeting. See In re Auto. Antitrust Cases I & II (2016) 1 CA5th 127 in §20.4.

A trial court permitted lay opinion on the appearance of hay bales but properly excluded such testimony on where the bales came from because plaintiff could not show that her opinions on the appearance of hay bales had any rational basis. Osborne v Todd Farm Servs. (2016) 247 CA4th 43. See §20.4.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

The psychotherapist-patient privilege does not protect patient records that are subpoenaed by the Medical Board of California as long as the board demonstrates that the subpoena “is supported by a compelling interest and that the information demanded is ‘relevant and material’ to the particular investigation being conducted.” Cross v Superior Court (2017) 11 CA5th 305, 316, quoting Wood v Superior Court (1985) 166 CA3d 1138, 1148. See §37.15A.

Unduly Prejudicial Evidence

In People v Snyder (2016) 1 CA5th 622, defense counsel’s failure to specify at trial which exhibits should and should not have been admitted precluded the trial court from weighing the probative and prejudicial values of the exhibits. As a result, counsel forfeited his argument based on the existence of an evidentiary alternative. See §§31.8, 31.17.

If a party believes that the trial court misunderstands the nature of the theory on the evidence and thus cannot appreciate the potential for undue prejudice in admitting the evidence, that party must alert the trial court to this error in reasoning; the determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion is based on what the court was made aware of at the time it ruled on the motion. People v Fruits (2016) 247 CA4th 188. See §31.16.

Evidence of prior misconduct involving domestic violence was improperly allowed to be used in a way that “was highly inflammatory and was not specifically relevant to the purpose for which the past incident of domestic violence was admitted.” See People v Disa (2016) 1 CA5th 654 in §32.7.

Work Product Doctrine

Materials submitted by the Legislative Counsel to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency on an assembly bill comprised “impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories” that are protected by the attorney work product privilege, and the trial court erred in finding waiver of the privilege. See Labor & Workforce Dev. Agency v Superior Court (2018) 19 CA5th 12, 34, in §§35.3, 35.8.

The court in Tucker Ellis LLP v Superior Court (2017) 12 CA5th 1233, 1242, considered whether the “attorney” who holds the work product privilege is the attorney who created the work product or his law firm employer, and held that, under the circumstances presented, the law firm held the privilege. See §35.5.

Voir Dire

Legislative changes to CCP §222.5, related to jury selection, were made by Stats 2017, ch 337, §1 (SB 658), effective January 1, 2018. The amendment triggered several changes, including the requirement that parties be provided reasonable time to evaluate the responses to a questionnaire, if utilized, before oral questioning commences. It also authorizes the parties to submit questions to the trial judge before he or she conducts voir dire and authorizes the judge to include these questions if he or she deems them proper. See chap 6.

Legislative changes to CCP §223, related to the examination of prospective jurors, were made by Stats 2017, ch 302, §2 (AB 1541), effective January 1, 2018. The amendment triggered numerous changes, including the requirement that a trial judge must permit counsel for each party to conduct a jury examination that is calculated to discover bias or prejudice with regard to the circumstances of a particular case or the parties before the court, and also that the scope of the examination conducted by counsel must be within reasonable limits prescribed by the trial judge in the judge’s sound discretion. See chap 6.

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Products specifications
PRACTICE AREA Civil Litigation & Torts
PRACTICE AREA Evidence
PRODUCT GROUP Publication