April 2017 Update
Effective January 1, 2016, CC §§816.50–816.66 was enacted providing for the creation of greenway easements. See §§1.7, 1.28.
In Schafer v City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 CA4th 1250, the court held that if the landowner is a public entity, to find an easement by estoppel the court must weigh the policy concerns to determine whether the avoidance of injustice in the particular case justifies any adverse impact on public policy or the public interest. See §1.22.
In Nellie Gail Ranch Owners' Ass'n v McMullin (2016) 4 CA5th 982 and Salazar v Matejcek (2016) 245 CA4th 634, the courts denied an equitable easement and order removal of structures built intentionally, or perhaps even negligently, encroaching on adjacent property. See §1.27.
In Pacific Shores Prop. Owners Ass'n v Department of Fish & Wildlife (2016) 244 CA4th 12, the Department of Fish and Wildlife was strictly liable for the damages it caused property owners when it intentionally flooded private property to protect environmental resources. See §§3.44, 3.55, 14.40.
In Save Our Big Trees v City of Santa Cruz (2015) 241 CA4th 694, the city failed to demonstrate that its proposed modification of its heritage tree ordinance fell within categorical exemption to CEQA. See §4.21.
In Salazar v Matejcek (2016) 245 CA4th 634, owners of an undeveloped rural property who had personal reasons for keeping their ten-acre parcel in a natural undeveloped state were awarded restoration costs to replace 225 trees that were willfully and maliciously destroyed by a neighboring property owner and treble damages under CCP §733 and CC §3346. See §§4.33, 4.40, 4.46.
In Fulle v Kanani (Jan. 31, 2017, B271240) 2017 Cal App Lexis 65, the court held that annoyance and discomfort damages resulting from injuries to trees may be doubled or trebled under both CCP §733 and CC §3346. See §4.43.
Effective January 1, 2016, CC §835 was enacted providing that a property owner may install an electrified security fence if the property is not in a residential zone, the fence is identified by prominently placed warning signs, the height of the fence does not exceed 10 feet, the fence is located behind a perimeter fence that is not less than 6 feet in height, and the fence meets specified electrotechnical and local requirements. See §5.33.
Proposition 64 enacted the Control Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act (commonly referred to as the Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA)) legalizes the possession and cultivation of certain amounts of marijuana products beginning November 9, 2016 (see Health & S C §§11018–11018.2, 11362.1–11362.45) and provides new criminal provisions for possession, cultivation, transportation, and sale of excessive amounts of marijuana products (see Health & S C §§11357–11362.8). See §§10.13, 10.17, 10.61–10.70.
In Boxer v City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 CA4th 1212, the court held that a landowner does not have a right to a view over adjacent property, and mere impairment of a view does not constitute a taking or damaging of property. See §13.1.
In Property Reserve, Inc. v Superior Court (2016) 1 CA5th 151, the court held that a temporary physical alteration of property for the purpose of pre-condemnation testing and inspection was not a per se physical taking. See §14.40.
In Mendez v Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC. (2016) 3 CA5th 248, 262, the court held that even though noise emanating from a public address system was clearly audible to the plaintiffs and other neighbors in the area, the noise was not unreasonably disturbing within the meaning of the county noise ordinance. See §§16.3, 16.10.
In Walters v Boosinger (2016) 2 CA5th 421, 432, the court held that certain documents gave an ex-boyfriend notice that his ex-girlfriend asserted that real property was being held in joint tenancy, thus starting the 3-year statute of limitations for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. See §16.46.
In Nara Bank v Pho (In re Pho) (Bankr ND Cal 2016) 2016 Bankr Lexis 1792, after defending an adversary proceeding seeking nondischargeability of debt based on fraud, the bankruptcy debtor was not entitled to attorney fees because the bankruptcy court did not interpret loan documents in reaching its decision regarding dischargeability; case did not involve "action on a contract" under CC §1717. See §16.88.
In Harris v Stampolis (2016) 248 CA4th 484, in considering a restraining order, the court held that the determination of whether it is reasonably probable that unlawful act will be repeated rests upon nature of unlawful violent act evaluated in light of relevant surrounding circumstances of its commission and whether precipitating circumstances continue to exist so as to establish likelihood of future harm. See §17.23.