 |
TEST
YOUR KNOWLEDGE |





|
 |
Civil
Rights |
So Far, a Surprising Year for Civil Rights
Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke Law
School, Durham, North Carolina
E-mail: chemerinsky@law.duke.edu
Introduction
Three Recent Cases
Smith v Jackson, Mississippi
Smith—The Majority Opinion
Jackson v Birmingham Board of Education
Jackson—The Majority Opinion
Johnson v California
Johnson—The Majority Opinion
Conclusion
Introduction
The Rehnquist Court will not be remembered as a friend of civil rights plaintiffs. In its early years, it narrowly interpreted key federal civil rights statutes, which led to Congress adopting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to overrule those decisions. In the early 1990s, in a series of rulings, the court ordered the end of successful school desegregation orders, even when it meant the resegregation of public schools. More recently, the Rehnquist Court has limited the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to sue state governments, such as, in holding that states may not be sued for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) or Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Three Recent Cases
In light of this history, the court's civil rights decisions this year have been quite surprising. There have been three major civil rights suits that have been decided in favor of the civil rights plaintiff. Each is likely to have important benefits for civil rights plaintiffs in the months and years ahead.
Smith v Jackson, Mississippi
The case with likely the greatest practical impact will be Smith v Jackson, Mississippi, (2005) 544 US ___, 125 S Ct 1536. The issue in Smith is whether disparate impact claims can be brought under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC §623(a)(2). The Supreme Court has long held that proving a violation of equal protection requires demonstrating that the government acted with a discriminatory intent. However, in the landmark ruling of Griggs v Duke Power Co., (1971) 401 US 424, the court held that plaintiffs suing under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, gender or religion, could prevail by proving disparate impact or by showing discriminatory intent.
The federal Court of Appeals had split on the question of whether disparate impact would be sufficient under the ADEA. In a 5-3 decision, without a majority opinion and without Chief Justice William Rehnquist participating, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims may be brought under the ADEA.
Smith—The Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality of four; his opinion
was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Justice Stevens stressed that the ADEA and Title VII use
identical language. He explained: “[W]hen Congress uses
the same language in two statutes having similar purposes,
particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other,
it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that
text to have the same meaning in both statutes.” The
court thus concluded that “Griggs therefore is a precedent
of compelling importance.”
Although the court found that disparate impact claims may
be brought under the ADEA, it said that “the scope of
disparate impact liability under ADEA is narrower than
under Title VII.” The ADEA expressly allows employers to
discriminate for “reasons other than age.” The court
noted that Congress understandably believed that there
likely are more circumstances where age, as compared to
race, could be relevant to an employee's ability to perform
certain tasks on the job.
Justice Scalia cast the surprising fifth vote for the majority.
He emphasized the need to defer to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's interpretation of the ADEA. Under Chevron USA Inc. v
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (1984) 467 US 837, federal
courts are to defer to agency interpretations of their enabling
statutes. Justice Scalia thus concluded: “The EEOC has express
authority to promulgate rules and regulations interpreting the
ADEA. It has exercised that authority to recognize disparate-impact
claims…. In my view, that is sufficient to resolve this case.”
The practical reality is that it is often much easier for
a civil rights plaintiff to prove disparate impact than
discriminatory intent. Although the court ruled that Smith
failed to demonstrate impermissible impact, the court has
significantly opened the courthouse doors to plaintiffs
bringing age discrimination claims.
Jackson v Birmingham Board of Education
A second important victory for civil rights plaintiffs was in
Jackson v Birmingham Board of Education, (2005) 125 S Ct 1497.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 29 USC §1681,
prohibits educational institutions receiving federal funds from
discriminating based on gender. Robert Jackson, a public school
teacher in Birmingham, Alabama, coached a girls’ high school
basketball team. He repeatedly complained that his team was not
receiving equal funding and equal access to athletic equipment
and facilities as compared with the boys’ team. After complaining,
he began to receive negative performance evaluations and ultimately
was removed from his position as coach.
Jackson—The Majority Opinion
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Title IX’s private
right of action encompasses claims for retaliation. Again, in a
5-3 decision, the court ruled in favor of the civil rights plaintiff.
Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the court joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O’Connor declared:
“Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of
sex discrimination is another form of intentional discrimination
encompassed by Title IX’s private cause of action.” Retaliation,
the court explained, is an intentional response to a complaint of
sex discrimination. Thus, the court declared: “We conclude that
when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he
complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional
‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex’ in violation of Title IX.”
Title IX has been crucial in increasing funding for sports for
women’s athletic programs at the high school and college levels.
The court's decision in Jackson will be important in helping to
expose violations as those who do so will be protected from retaliation.
Johnson v California
The third civil rights victory for plaintiffs is perhaps the most surprising.
In Johnson v California, (2005) 125 S Ct 1141, the court ruled that a state
prison rule requiring racial segregation of prisoners must meet strict scrutiny.
When a prisoner arrives at an institution, California prison regulations
provide that he will be held for 60 days for evaluation. This occurs whether
the prisoner is first entering the system or if the inmate is being transferred
to a new institution. During this time, inmates are generally housed with two
per cell and many criteria are used in deciding which inmates to cell together.
One key factor is the race of the inmates. In the federal district court
proceedings, California conceded that it is virtually impossible that inmates
of different races would be housed together. California categorizes prisoners
into four basic racial groups: whites, African-Americans, Latinos (who are
divided between northern California and southern California Latinos based
on how prison gangs are organized), and Asians (who are sub-divided into
several groups based on nationality).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of
California. The Ninth Circuit said that equal protection claims by prisoners
are subjected only to rational basis review and that the use of race in assigning
prisoners is constitutional because it is reasonably related to the state’s
legitimate penological interest in preventing prison violence.
Johnson—The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court in a 5-3 decision reversed the Ninth Circuit and held
that the racial segregation of prisoners must meet strict scrutiny.
Once more, Justice O’Connor wrote for the court, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O’Connor’s opinion
stressed that any government-mandated segregation, even in prisons,
must meet strict scrutiny. The court did not decide whether California’s
prison regulation met this exacting test, but instead remanded the case
for the application of strict scrutiny.
This is the first time in decades that the Supreme Court has used strict
scrutiny for any claim by prisoners. It certainly makes it very likely
that the California prisoners will succeed in asserting their right to equal protection.
Conclusion
Obviously, it is misleading to draw broad conclusions from three Supreme
Court decisions. Still, it is notable, that the three major civil rights
cases so far this term have come down in favor of the plaintiffs and set
precedents that will help civil rights plaintiffs for years to come.
But it must be remembered that all three cases had only five justices in
the majority, heightening the sense that future nominations to the Supreme
Court will be crucial in this, like all areas of law.
A version of this article was originally published in the Daily Journal.
Back
to top
|
Jefferson's Evidence Benchbook
|